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It is undeniable that most countries consider international trade to be a 
key part of their economies and therefore encourage exports.  It is also 
true that as the international business transactions increase, so will the 
disputes amongst trading partners.  Therefore, a very important part of 
international trade agreements are the dispute resolution mechanisms 
in order to avoid national courts. 
 
National courts are often seen as the less preferable alternative for 
parties in disputes involving issues such as dumping or subsidies.   
Parties view the national courts as displaying national favoritisms.  For 
this reason, countries often include dispute resolution procedures to 
deal with disputes that may arise under the agreement.  The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (the NAFTA) is no exception.1 
 
Part II of this paper will provide an overview the dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the NAFTA.  Part III will focus on Chapter 19 of the 
NAFTA and discuss some problems that have arisen under this 
Chapter.  Part IV will compare Chapter 20 of the NAFTA with the 
dispute resolution mechanism under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Part V will discuss the future of Chapters 19 and 20 under a 





                                                 
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,  32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1994) (hereinafter NAFTA). 
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2. DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS UNDER NAFTA 
 
The NAFTA and its labor and environment side agreements include a 
variety of mechanisms for resolving disputes.  These mechanisms are in 
the following chapters: 
(1)  Chapter 11 - resolution of investment disputes between 
foreign investors and host governments; 
(2)  Chapter 14 - disputes over the provision of financial 
services; 
(3)  Chapter 19 – appeals of antidumping and countervailing 
duty determinations by national administrative 
authorities; 
(4)  Chapter 20 – inter-governmental disputes over the 
interpretation and application of the agreement 
generally; 
(5)  North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation – alleged failure of a NAFTA government to 
enforce national environmental laws; and 
(6)  North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation – 
alleged failure of a NAFTA government to enforce 
national labor laws.2 
 
Of the above listed, the one that has been used more often is Chapter 
19.  In the first four years of NAFTA there had been three cases filed 
under Chapter 11, no cases under Chapter 14, forty under Chapter 19, 
two under Chapter 20, thirteen actions under the labor side agreement, 
and seventeen under the environmental side agreement.3 As of January 
                                                 
2 David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes Under NAFTA’s Chapter 19:  The Lessons of Extending 
the Binational Panel Process to Mexico, 29 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 297 (1998). 
3 Id. at 303.   5
11, 2003, there were twenty-nine active cases and sixty-nine completed 
cases under Chapter 19.4  B y  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  n u m b e r s ,  i t  c a n  b e  
observed that Chapter 19 has had considerable testing and for this 
reason we will first focus on the experience of dispute resolution under 
this Chapter. 
 
3. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER CHAPTER 19 
 
A. General Provisions 
 
Chapter 19 is one of the most important chapters dealing with dispute 
resolution regarding the most common of the unfair trade practices in 
international trade, dumping and countervailing duties.  Dumping 
occurs when the good produced in one country is sold in the territory of 
another country at below “normal value” and the resulting sales cause 
injury to the domestic producers in the importing country.5  As a result, 
and in accordance to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)6, member countries may impose antidumping duties to offset 
the injury.  On the other hand, countervailing duties may be imposed to 
offset certain government subsidies to the producer in one country that 
result in subsidized sales in another country and those sales cause 
injury to producers of similar goods in the importing country.7    
 
Chapter 19 Article 1901 states, “Article 1904 applies only with respect 
to goods that the competent authority of the importing Party, applying 
the importing Party’s antidumping or countervailing duty law to the 
                                                 
4 Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 489 (2003). 
5 GANTZ, supra note 2, at 303.  
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
(hereinafter GATT).   
7 GANTZ, supra note 2, at 304.   6
facts of a specific case, determines are goods of another Party.”8  As 
member countries of GATT, the basic procedure for imposing 
antidumping and countervailing duties in Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico is covered in the Agreement on the Implementation of 
Article VI of GATT.  Therefore, the internal procedures of each country 
should be very similar.  A very brief description of the procedure 
includes the steps mentioned below. 
 
First, the national production, presents a complaint to the 
administrative agency regarding an identical or similar product that is 
coming into the country at below normal value or is subsidized and that 
is causing or threatening to cause harm to the national industry.  The 
administrative agencies in the United States, Mexico, and Canada differ 
as to who carries out the investigation.  In Canada the antidumping and 
subsidy margins are determined by the Revenue Canada.  In the United 
States they are determined by the Department of Commerce.  The injury 
part in Canada is determined by the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal and in the United States by the U.S. International Trade 
Commission.  In Mexico both the antidumping or subsidy margins and 
the injury are determined by the Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento 
Industrial (SECOFI, now the Secretaría de Economía SE). The 
establishment of antidumping and countervailing duties is regulated by 
national law under Chapter 19 and must be in accordance to the GATT.   
 
Second, there is an investigation that may lead to a preliminary finding 
of dumping or subsidization and a preliminary antidumping or 
countervailing duty may be imposed.  The antidumping duty is usually 
the difference between the normal value (what the product is sold for in 
its country of origin) and the export price.  In the case of subsides, the 
                                                 
8 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1901(1).   7
countervailing duty is the amount (in percentage) of the subsidization.  
Later, that preliminary determination may become a final determination 
of antidumping duty or countervailing duty or it may be reversed 
because there is a finding that dumping or subsidization did not occur.  
Once a final determination is made, the losing party has the option to 
appeal internally to the national federal courts or may opt to appeal to 
the binational panel process as established in the NAFTA, Chapter 19.   
 
The binational panel process substitutes the federal courts of each 
NAFTA Party.  “Each Party reserves the right to apply its antidumping 
law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the territory of 
any other Party.”9  Each Party reserves the right to change or modify its 
antidumping law or countervailing duty law subject to some notice 
requirements.10  Therefore, the panel, since it stands in the shoes of the 
each Party’s federal courts, must apply the substantive antidumping 
and countervailing duty laws of the importing nation (the country where 
the original antidumping dispute arose).  The panel must consider the 
relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative 
practice, and judicial precedents of the importing country. 11  The panel 
may “uphold a final determination or remand it for action not 
inconsistent with the panel’s decision.”12 
 
The establishment of a binational panel is found in Annex 1901.2.  It 
states that the Parties shall establish and maintain a roster of 
individuals to serves as panelists, including judges and former judges to 
the fullest extent possible.13  This list shall have a list 75 candidates, at 
least 25 from each country.  Candidates shall be of good character, high 
                                                 
9 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art.   1902 (1) 
10 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art.  1902 (2) 
11 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art.  1902 (1) 
12 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(8) 
13 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2   8
standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of 
objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and general familiarity of 
international trade law, amongst other requirements.14  There will be 
five panelists chosen from the roster, each Party choosing two panelists 
and both Parties agreeing on the fifth.  Once the panelists are chosen, 
the panelists choose a chairperson.  The panelists must follow a strict 
code of conduct.  Panelists are required to disclose any circumstances 
that raise a conflict or appearance of conflict.15 
 
The decision of the panel must be decided by majority vote and all 
panelists must vote.  “If a panelist becomes unable to fulfill panel duties 
or is disqualified, proceedings of the panel shall be suspended pending 
the selection of a substitute panelist…”16  This may cause delays in the 
proceedings. 
Once the panel makes a determination, there is no appeal.  The 
only exception to this is when there is an allegation of gross 
misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest, where the panel 
decision departs from a fundamental rule of procedure, or where 
the panel exceeds its power, authority, or jurisdiction, for 
example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review.17  
In this case the Parties involved shall establish an extraordinary 
challenge committee.  This committee will be comprised of three 
members selected from a 15-person roster where each country 
provides five members to the list.  This type of challenge is very 
limited...18   
 
This type of challenge was only used three times under the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement19 and only one Extraordinary 
Challenge Committee request has been made under NAFTA.20 
                                                 
14 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.1(1) 
15 See NAFTA Code of Conduct, §  II(A). 
16 See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901.2, para. 9. 
17 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 13. 
18 GANTZ, supra note 2, at 313. 
19 The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M.   9
 
In addition to having very limited opportunity to appeal once the 
decision is made, “the decision of the panel … shall be binding on the 
involved Parties with respect to the particular matter between the 
Parties that is before the panel.”21  That is to say, the panel decision will 
not create binding precedent for future panels.   This may lead to 
inconsistencies in the decisions of the panels.  However, some panels 
have used former panel decisions as persuasive. 
 
B. Challenges Faced in Reviewing Mexican Cases 
 
The addition of Mexico to the binational panel process that was already 
in practice between the United States and Canada for several years 
created unexpected challenges to the Chapter 19 proceedings.  Several 
of these challenges will be discussed below. 
 
First of all, Mexico has a civil law tradition.  This created a new 
challenge because the CUSFTA had been between two common law 
countries.  In panel proceedings where there are lawyers from two 
different legal traditions the way of thinking about legal issues may be 
different, especially when one does not fully understand the system of 
the other.  “For example, Mexican practice requires extensive, properly 
executed, and authenticated powers of attorney before an attorney can 
represent a client before a court of law or obtain access to the 
confidential portions of the administrative record without posting of a 
bond.  Some such matters, which are at best questions of 
administrative procedure in the United States, reach a level of 
                                                                                                                                               
281 (1988) (hereinafter CUSFTA). 
20 Michael Wallace Gordon, Forms of Dispute Resolution in the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
13 Fla. J. Int’l L. 16 (2000). 
21 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1904, para. 9.   10
constitutional guarantee in Mexico.”22  This may be the source of major 
controversy between the panelists because on the one hand the 
American panelist may not think that this is very important (if there 
was a problem, just fix it, a pragmatic approach) whereas a Mexican 
panelist may consider that the whole case depends on this precise 
procedural matter (a formalistic approach). 
 
Another major distinction is that the Mexican civil law system does not 
recognize precedent as understood by American lawyers.  Mexican 
courts decisions are not binding unless a court at the appellate level 
has ruled in the same manner in regards to the same legal issue at least 
five times and then, only then, does it become binding precedent 
(known as “jurisprudencia”).  This may become a difficulty because 
panelists must “consider the relevant statutes, legislative history, 
regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedent”  of the 
importing country.  Additionally, “judicial review of final administrative 
determination in antidumping and subsidies cases in Mexico did not 
exist before 1994.”23  Therefore, the panelists, that stand in the shoes of 
the Mexican federal reviewing court have no direction as to how the 
Mexican Federal Tax Court would have decided the issue under 
Mexican law. 
 
Another matter that was not anticipated for Chapter 19 panel 
proceeding was the language differences with regards to permitting 
more time.  One consideration is that the entire process will take more 
time than that foreseen because of the need to translate all documents 
for monolingual panelists.   
 
                                                 
22 GANTZ, supra note 2, at 318. 
23 Id. at 320.   11
Furthermore, the Mexican international trade bar is limited in 
comparison with the United States and Canada.  Some problems have 
arisen because of conflict of interests of Mexican panelists.  The 
conflicts standard “appearance of conflict” is very broad and this caused 
that in the first Mexican NAFTA case two Mexican panelists to resign 
because of actual or alleged conflict.24  This of course caused delays in 
the proceedings. 
 
Another delay in Mexican cases has been caused by the fact that in 
Mexico Secretaría de Economía (SE)  makes both dumping margin and 
injury determinations.  In the United States and Canada these are 
separate issues and analyzed by separate agencies.  An appeal of each 
issue is taken to a different panel.  In Mexico both issues are reviewed 
by SE.  In other words, when parties appeal to a binational panel from a 
Mexican case, the panel must review both issues and thus, because of 
the added burden, the panels usually take more time. 
 
The Chapter 19 procedure has been strongly criticized by some 
American authors as “fundamentally flawed and undemocratic.”25  The 
argument made is that, “it places far reaching decision-making power in 
the hands of private individuals who do not have judicial experience 
and who are not accountable for their performance.”26  The claim is that 
it is an unconstitutional procedure that should not be extended to other 
countries that the U.S. intends to enter into trade agreements.  It is 
argued that the difficulties of lawyers from diverse legal systems 
interpreting each others laws seems fruitless if the parties could just as 
well resolve their disputes under the World Trade Organization 
                                                 
24 See Rolled Steel Plate from Canada, MEX-96-1904-02, Decision  (English) at 12-13. One panelist 
resigned for lack of time; the other because he took a consultancy position with the Canadian 
government. 
25 See Jennifer Danner Riccardi, The Failure of Chapter 19 in Design and Practice:  An Opportunity for 
Reform, 28 Ohio, N.U.L. Rev. 727 (2002). 
26 Id.   12
procedures.  One proposal for reform includes having judicial review by 
U.S. courts of the panel decisions prior to implementation.  This 
proposal may of course sound reasonable from a U.S. perspective but, it 
may not be the case from a Canadian or Mexican perspective, unless 
each country could review the decision in their own court system.   
Consequently, the parties requesting review would be back in national 
courts, which is what they wanted to avoid in the first place. 
 
On the other hand, others claim that “while Chapter 19 is in need of 
some minor tinkering, it is on the whole functioning well.”27  Richard O. 
Cunningham recognizes that the introduction of the panel process to 
Mexico introduced numerous complexities, such as those mentioned 
above.  However, he argues that there “are compelling reasons to 
maintain the Chapter 19 panel process as an alternative” (to the WTO 
panel procedure).  Although, he cites advantages to the WTO process, 
such as it being more expeditious than the binational panel appeals 
from Mexican decisions where the process has had serious delays, he 
claims that the Chapter 19 process provides a useful alternative.  He 
asserts that the binational panels have, with few exceptions, reached 
well-reasoned decisions.  And, “unlike the WTO system, in which 
private parties must persuade their governments to initiate dispute 
settlement, the Chapter 19 system gives aggrieved private parties the 
power to bring their own challenges.  Thus, under Chapter 19, the 
aggrieved parties are not inhibited by external politics or the 
government’s own internal policies.”28  He concludes, that “most 
importantly, the Chapter 19 panel process serves a valuable function 
with respect to Mexican import decisions, as to which it represents the 
                                                 
27 Richard O. Cunningham, NAFTA CHAPTER 19:  How Much Does it Work?  How Much is Needed? 
Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law Institute Conference, The Management and Resolution of 
Cross Border Disputes as Canada/U.S. Enter the 21
st Century, Cleveland, Ohio, April 14-26, 2000,  26 
Can.-U.S. L.J. 79 (2000). 
28 Id. at 88.   13
only viable means of ensuring compliance with domestic law and 
procedures.”29 
 
4. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE WTO AND CHAPTER 20. 
 
The dispute resolution mechanism under the WTO is covered by the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).30  This part of the paper will 
not discuss the entire DSU process but will point out some differences 
with dispute resolution under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA.   
 
First of all one major difference is that member states in the WTO follow 
one settlement procedure when a conflict arises.  All the WTO 
agreements refer the members to the DSU.  This is quite different from 
what can be observed in NAFTA.  As discussed in Part II, NAFTA has six 
mechanisms for resolving disputes depending on the subject. 
 
Secondly, although the procedure seems similar between the NAFTA 
and the WTO they have some interesting differences.  Each has some 
sort of body or institution that is in charge of dispute resolution, the 
Dispute Settlement Body for the WTO and the Free Trade Commission 
for the NAFTA.  The NAFTA provides for a choice of forum as to whether 
disputes will be settled in NAFTA or the WTO.31  Both the DSU and 
Chapter 20 of the NAFTA follow a process that begins with 
consultations.  However after consultations, NAFTA requires a meeting 
with the Free Trade Commission to attempt to mediate the difference, 
whereas the WTO permits mediation at any point during the procedure 
and it is not a mandatory step prior to requesting a panel.  The next 
step for both is the establishment of the panel.  The WTO has three 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 See Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 112 (1994) (hereinafter DSU). 
31 See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 2005.     14
panelist (with a choice of five) and NAFTA requires five panelists.  The 
selection process is also different.  The NAFTA requires a cross-selection 
where each party chooses two from the list of the other party and a 
chair selected by agreement.  The panelists in the WTO are not to be 
from the countries in dispute, without the parties agreeing otherwise.32  
The WTO has one list and the three panelists are chosen from that list.  
The functions and qualification requirements of the panelists are 
basically the same in both. 
 
A major difference between the both systems arises after the panel has 
made its determination.  Under the WTO the losing party can appeal to 
the Appellate Body, a standing Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body may 
reexamine the case with regard only to “issues of law… and legal 
interpretations”, and not to issues of fact.33  Chapter 20 of the NAFTA 
does not have an appeal process similar to that of the WTO.  Chapter 19 
does not either.  We must consider that Chapter 19 is already reviewing 
a prior decision, made at the national level so it is acting like a 
reviewing body.  Whereas, Chapter 20 reviews for the first time.   
However,  Chapters 19 decisions can be attacked under the very 
restricted conditions of the Extraordinary Challenge Committees 
mentioned above.  This however, is not a regular appeal as understood 
in common law systems. 
 
Both the WTO and NAFTA appear to implement the final decisions in a 
very similar manner.  Both provide for suspension of benefits if, at the 
end of the day, the parties cannot work out an agreement.  However, a 
distinction between the two is the supervision of the panel’s final 
recommendation.  The WTO provides for in Article 22 of the DSU that 
the DSB can authorize the suspension of benefits and supervises the 
                                                 
32 See supra note 30, at art. 8(3). 
33 See DSU, supra note 30, at art. 17(4) & (6).   15
implementation stage.  The NAFTA’s implementation phase is not 
supervised, which may lead to a failure in any real resolution to the 
dispute. 
 
Professor David Lopez discusses Chapter 20 dispute settlement and 
notes that few disputes are pushed to arbitration.34  He observes that of 
the eight complaints lodged by the end of 1996, only three have gone to 
arbitration … Canadian agricultural tariffication, U.S. escape clause 
restraints on Mexican brooms, and U.S. refusal to admit Mexican 
trucks and buses.35  Of the three, two have been by Mexico against the 
United States. 
 
In the first case, the U.S. International Trade Commission found in 
1996 that the elimination of tariffs on Mexican brooms resulted in a 
surge of imports that were substantial cause of serious injury or its 
threat to the U.S. broom industry.36  A tariff increase was 
recommended, through the escape clause proceedings, but the USTR 
attempted to negotiate a solution with Mexico.  When the negotiations 
failed, Mexico requested consultations under Chapter 20.  President 
William Clinton imposed substantial tariffs and tariff-rate-quotas on 
brooms from Mexico and other countries for three years.37  Mexico 
retaliated by raising tariffs on several U.S. products, such as U.S. wine, 
brandy, bourbon, whiskey, to name an few.  In 1998 the NAFTA 
Chapter 20 arbitration panel ruled in Mexico’s favor and U.S. officials 
indicated that they would comply.  The U.S. took nine months to do so 
and Mexico removed its retaliatory tariffs.38  This is one example of how 
Chapter 20 does in fact work.  However, the other case by Mexico 
                                                 
34 David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA:  Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 Tex. Int’l L. 
J. 163 (1997). 
35 Id. 
36 RALPH H. FOLSOM, NAFTA IN A NUTSHELL, WEST GROUP 1999. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.   16
against the U.S. demonstrates the contrary.  The trucking case 
demonstrates that the Chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanism needs 
improvement.   
 
Trucking services transport almost three-fourths of the U.S.-Mexico 
trade.39 Trade between the U.S. and Mexico grew from $100 billion in 
1994 to $248 billion in 2000.40  Pursuant to the NAFTA agreement, 
Mexican trucks should have been allowed into the four border states on 
December 18, 1995.41  Access throughout the United States was to be 
liberalized on January 1, 2000.42  The U.S. did not comply with these 
commitments. U.S. highway safety concerns were the primary reason 
given by the U.S. for noncompliance.  However, “some commentators 
argue that congressional concern for highway safety is simply a façade 
for the real issue of potential loss of American jobs.”43  Nonetheless, the 
moratorium on issuance of operating authority to foreign carriers, 
established by the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, was not lifted 
with respect to Mexican carriers pursuant to the agreement obligations.  
Consequently, Mexico initiated Chapter 20 proceedings against the 
United States. 
 
As can be observed form the above procedure, the first step is 
consultations, which Mexico requested in December 1995, pursuant to 
Article 2006.  This article states that “any Party may request … 
consultations with any other Party regarding any actual or proposed 
measure or any other matter that it considers might affect the operation 
                                                 
39 Carrie Anne Arnett, The Mexican Trucking Dispute:  A Bottleneck to Free Trade.  A Tough (Road) Test 
on the NAFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 25 Hous. J. Int’l L. 561 (2003).  See In the Matter of 
Cross-Border Trucking Servs., Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, Final Report (Feb. 6, 2001), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/trucking.pdf. 
40 Id. 
41 See NAFTA, supra note 1 at 746-47. 
42 See NAFTA, supra note 1 at 704-05. 
43 ARNETT, supra note 39, at 572.   17
of this Agreement.”44  Consultations were unsuccessful and Mexico 
requested a meeting with the NAFTA Trade Commission in July 1998, 
which did not resolve the dispute.  Thus, in accordance with Chapter 20 
a panel was established. 
 
The panel resolved based on the arguments presented by Mexico and 
the U.S.  In summary, the U.S. position was that the delay in lifting the 
moratorium was “both prudent and consistent with U.S. obligations 
under the NAFTA.”45   This argument was based on Mexico’s inadequate 
safety regulatory system.  The United States argued that it had no 
obligation to license the operation of the Mexican trucking firms in 
circumstances in which:  “(1) serious concerns persist regarding their 
overall safety record;  (2) Mexico is still developing first-line regulatory 
and enforcement measures needed to address trucking safety 
standards, and (3) essential bilateral cooperative arrangements are not 
fully in place.”46 
 
On the other hand, Mexico argued that Mexican-owned carriers were 
denied national and most-favored nation treatment in their ability to 
obtain operating authority to provide cross-border truck services in the 
border states as of December 18, 1995 and throughout the U.S. as of 
January 1, 2000.  Mexican-owned carriers should have been allowed to 
apply for operating authority based on the same procedure as those 
applied to U.S. and Canadian carriers.47  Mexico stated that no 
conditions were provided for in NAFTA  that required Mexico to adopt 
an identical regulatory safety system.48  Mexico argues that a blanket 
                                                 
44 See NAFTA, supra note 1 at 694.  
45 ARNETT, supra note 39, at 586. 
46ARNETT, supra note 39, at 587.  
47 Id. at 483. 
48 Id.    18
refusal by the U.S. to examine all Mexican applications was a direct 
violation of NAFTA’s national treatment obligations. 
 
Additionally, Mexico argued a violation of the most-favored nation 
treatment principle.  The U.S. does not impose the same rigid safety 
requirements, regulations, and restrictions on Canadian carriers.49   
 
The U.S. responded to both of the Mexican arguments presented above 
that in the obligations of national and most-favored nation treatment, 
the United States defined “like circumstances” as not necessitating that 
“a particular measure must in every case accord exactly the same 
treatment to U.S. and Canadian service providers.”50  Thus, “the United 
States may make and apply legitimate regulatory distinctions for 
purposes of ensuring the safety of U.S. roadways.”51  The U.S. further 
argued that because of the differences between the regulatory systems, 
“the circumstances relevant of the treatment of the Mexican-based 
trucking firms for safety purposes are not like those applicable to the 
treatment of Canadian and U.S. carriers.”52 
 
The panel unanimously held that a blanket refusal by the U.S. to grant 
operating authority and investment to Mexican nationals was 
impermissible under NAFTA.53  The panel held the following:  First, that 
the U.S. failure to review and consider applications for cross-border 
authority from Mexican nationals was and remains a breach of the U.S. 
obligations under Annex I, Articles 1202 and 1203; Second, the Panel 
dismissed the U.S. justification for inaction, the inadequacies in the 
Mexican regulatory system;  Thirdly, in respect to investment, the panel 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 ARNETT, supra note 39, at 587. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 589.   19
also determined against the U.S. as being in breach of its NAFTA 
obligations. 54   
 
The U.S. has been slow to comply with the panel’s determination and 
recommendations.  In June 2001, the U.S. complied with the 
investment portion of the panel’s decision and allowed Mexican 
investment in U.S. transportation companies, subject to all U.S. safety 
laws and regulations.55  The moratorium was lifted in late 2002.56  
However, because of internal political conflicts, the legislation to 
implement the decision was slow and later court action brought 
implementation to a complete halt. 
 
On January 16, 2003, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco 
ruled unanimously that the U.S. government must complete an 
environmental impact review before Mexican trucks are allowed beyond 
the existing 20-mile commercial border zone.57  Appeals Court Judge 
Kim M. Wardlaw wrote, “although we agree with the importance of the 
United States’ compliance with its treaty obligations with its southern 
neighbor, Mexico, such compliance cannot come at the cost of violating 
United States Law.”58  Thus, the borders remain closed to Mexican 
trucks. 
 
The trucking case is a classic example of how this dispute resolution 
mechanism under NAFTA does not work as planned.  A case should 
take 220 days, from the request for the formation of a panel until the 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 ARNETT, supra note 39, at 587. 
56 Id. 
57 Diane Lindquist, Court Keeps Mexico’s Long-Haul Trucks Back, San Diego Union, January 17, 2003. 
58 Henry Weinstein, The Nation U.S. Court Bars Mexican Trucks Ruling, Says a Thorough Review of 
Possible Environmental Effects is Required Before Bush can Invoke NAFTA and Lift Restrictions, L.A. 
Times, January 17, 2003.   20
final report.59  The trucking case began on December 18, 1995 and a 
panel decision was made on February 6, 2001, six years.  This time-
frame obviously does not respond to the need for an efficient dispute 
resolution mechanism.  Furthermore, once the panel decision has been 
handed out, the parties should agree on a resolution.  However, the 
NAFTA does not provide a mechanism to force the parties to comply 
with their obligations or panel recommendations.   
 
Needless to say that the perspective from the Mexican side is clearly one 
of disappointment.  The U.S. cannot simply disregard its international 
obligations under agreements made with other countries.  This conduct 
weakens U.S. credibility in the international arena.  Other countries 
may look at this behavior and be less willing to enter into trade 
negotiations and agreements with the U.S. if at the end of the day its 
international obligations will be undermined by an internal court.   
Therefore, the entire dispute resolution mechanism of the NAFTA is 
called into question because of the non-compliance with a decision 
issued by a binational panel. 
 
5. THE FUTURE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 
 
The NAFTA provides several options for dispute settlement.  However, in 
analyzing Chapters 19 and 20 of the NAFTA and making some general 
comparisons with dispute settlement under the WTO, one can see that 
the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanisms can be improved.  This part 
will make some recommendations for improvement and will also analyze 
whether the NAFTA can work for a possible Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. 
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First of all, it seems that Chapter 19 procedures should allow for more 
time to adjust for the lag time due to translation work that was not 
contemplated by the negotiating Parties.  Perhaps a simple modification 
of the time schedule is needed. 
 
Second, the conflict of interest requirement is too broad.  The language 
could be changed to limit a conflicts period to a set amount of years so 
that there will be more persons qualified to be on the rosters.   
 
Third, the rosters for Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 could be reduced.  In 
this manner there are less persons on each list and they would be 
called more often to serve as panelist and this would improve the 
expertise of panel members and the consistency of the decisions.  This 
however, would mean that panelist would need to be better 
compensated. 
 
Fourth, some authors have suggested that a standing appellate body 
should be implemented into the NAFTA.  Others disagree with this 
proposal and state that this would just cause more delays in the final 
decisions.  More time would mean more money and so the costs would 
go up. 
 
Another suggestion is that Chapter 19 be expanded to include appellate 
review.  This would resolve inconsistencies and make panel 
jurisprudence more stable and consistent.  This of course would also 
extend the weight given to panel decisions as creating precedent that 
could be followed by subsequent panels. 
 
With all of these suggestions, could the NAFTA dispute resolution 
mechanism be extended to other countries if a Free Trade Agreement of 
the Americas is accomplished?  The answer depends on which dispute   22
resolution mechanism of the NAFTA we are referring to.  If we discuss 
Chapter 19, it seems quite a difficult task if we multiply the challenges 
faced in the Mexican NAFTA cases times the other new countries.  For 
example, if Brazil were incorporated the panel could include panelists 
speaking English, Spanish, and Portuguese and the travel distance for 
panelists to travel to meet would also be extended.  Additionally, the 
panelist would have to apply Brazilian unfair trade practices national 
law and be able to apply the standard of review under Brazilian law.   
Multiply this effort by each country added to the free trade area.  The 
matter gets more complicated.  Perhaps if the free trade area extended 
further down then the WTO dispute resolution mechanism for dumping 
and countervailing duty matters might be the better option.  Some 
authors have suggested that Chapter 19 no longer will be used if the 
FTAA comes into being.  For example, “the European Union does not 
permit one country to challenge another for subsidies or dumping.  If 
there is a trade issues that appears to involve unfair trade, it is brought 
under the antitrust provisions of the Rome Treaty.”60 Others have 
suggested that antidumping and countervailing cases will disappear as 
the countries integrate more fully and so the question may become 
moot. 
 
Additionally, if Chapter 20 negotiations are complicated between three 
Parties then it is much more complex if more members are added.  The 
political influence in the negotiations would make it more difficult to 
arrive at mutually-satisfactory agreements once more members are 
involved. Furthermore, supervision of panel recommendations would 
also be an issue.  The trucking case shows that when the parties do not 
have equal bargaining power, as is the case between Mexico and the 
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U.S., then it is difficult to compel another country to comply with its 







After analyzing the dispute settlement mechanisms of the NAFTA and 
particularly Chapters 19 and 20 it is the belief of this author that the 
Chapter 19 mechanism has resolved a large quantity of antidumping 
and countervailing disputes successfully.  Although their have been 
some difficulties along the way, especially with regards to Mexican 
cases, most have been resolved by unanimous panels and where the 
panels have split it has not been along country lines.  This may 
demonstrate that as panelists learn more about the other legal systems 
the difficulties may be smoothed out in the near future.   On the other 
hand, Chapter 20 cases demonstrate that there is still plenty of room 
for improvement, specifically in the supervision of panel determinations.  
As a final point, it is not foreseeable that the Parties will renegotiate the 
terms of the NAFTA that deal with dispute settlement. 
 
 